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I. Introduction 
 
Since the economic reforms began in 1978, China has achieved remarkable 
economic results. Real GDP per capita grew at an average annual rate of 8.1% in the 
period of 1978-2001.
1  Maintaining such a high growth rate over such a long period 
of time with a population of more than one billion truly is a miracle in world 
economic history (Lin et. al. 1994 and 1999). 
However, as shown in Figure 1 (a), the coefficients of variation of GDP per 
capita and per worker, and Figure 1(b), the Gini coefficients of GDP per capita and 
per worker, the disparities among different regions within China have increased since 
1990. In 2001, of the 30 provinces in China, Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin, the three 
metropolitan cities, had the highest per capita GDP in current prices– 37,382 yuan, 
25,300 yuan, and 19,986 yuan, respectively; and the four coastal provinces, Zhejiang, 
Guangdong, Jiangsu and Fujian, had per capita GDP of 14,550 yuan, 13,612 yuan, 
12,925 yuan, and 12,375 yuan, respectively.  In stark contrast, the four western 
provinces, Guizhou, Gansu, Guangxi, and Yunnan, had per capita GDP of 2,865 yuan, 
4,173 yuan,    4,679 yuan and 4,872 yuan, respectively. That is, the per capita GDP in 
Shanghai and Zhejiang were, respectively, 13 times and five times that of Guizhou.   
The widening regional disparities have attracted much attention both in and outside 
of China. Several hypotheses have been proposed to explain the widening disparities. 
In their empirical study of province-level growth in 1978-89, Chen and Fengč2000Ď
stressed the importance of private enterprises to economic growth. The varying 
developments of private economy may contribute to regional disparities. However, 
the experience of shock therapy in Eastern Europe and the countries formerly in the 
Soviet Union showed that privatization itself might not promote economic growth. 
The vitality of private enterprises in China has been due to their entry/adoption of 
labor-intensive industries/technologies, which are consistent with China’s 
comparative advantages.   
Lee (1994) and Dayal-Gulati and Husain (2000) emphasized the effects of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) on regional disparities. However, they did not analyze  4
factors determining the location and industrial distribution of FDI. Young (2000) 
argued that regional protectionism was a key factor in the widening of regional 
disparities because the protection of local markets led to deviations in resource 
allocation away from regional comparative advantages. However, regional 
protectionism and market segmentation were endogenous to the regional development 
strategy.  
Other studies (Démurger et al., 2001ĠFleisher and Chen 1997) attributed the 
widening of regional disparities to the biased regional policy of the central 
government or to location factors. In these studies, the scholars argued that the central 
government’s investment priority favoring the eastern region was the root for the 
lagging behind of the central and western regions and, at the same time, the 
unfavorable geographic conditions limited the development of the central and western 
regions. However, as we will point out in the following analyses, the level of the 
central government’s investments in the central and western regions is no less than 
that in the eastern region, especially in the period just prior to the reforms. If the 
policy bias of the central government’s investments is the main cause for the regional 
disparities, it is difficult to reconcile the fact that central and western regions received 
large amounts of investments in the period before the reforms, but they failed to 





































                                                                                                                                                               
1  The above data are from “Abstract of Statistics, China 2002” pp. 14-18.  5





































Figure 1(b): Gini Coefficients of GDP Per Capita and Per Worker 
NoteğThe GDPs in Figure 1(a) and (b) are measured in 1978 prices.   
Sources: Department of Comprehensive Statistics of National Bureau of Statistics, Comprehensive Statistical 
Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China, Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1999, and Various 
Provincial Statistics Yearbooks.  
 
In this paper, we propose that a flawed development strategy is responsible for 
the increasing disparities in economic development among provinces in China.  
Since the founding of the PRC, the government has pushed a “leap forward” strategy 
emphasizing the development of capital-intensive heavy industries.  In most 
provinces, however, the priority industries under this strategy were inconsistent with 
the comparative advantage determined by the factor endowments in those provinces. 
Many enterprises in the priority industries were not viable in competitive markets and 
required interventions in the markets by the government to support and protect them.
2  
Consequently, this leap-forward strategy retarded the functions of market, impeded 
capital accumulation and hindered technology and productivity progress in the 
provinces. The provinces in the central and western provinces continue to follow the 
leap-forward strategy and have poor growth performance. Therefore, it is imperative 
to replace the comparative advantage-defying leap-forward strategy with a  6
comparative advantage-following strategy and restructure the existing industries in 
each province according to the principle of comparative advantage. This latter 
strategy would enhance coordinated development among regions and provinces and, 
in effect, work more effectively to create sustainable national economic development.   
The regional effects of economic strategies in China are the subject of this paper. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews regional 
economic development policies since the founding of the PRC in 1949, especially in 
the period after the reforms and liberalization.  In the third section, we discuss how 
the leap forward strategy has influenced regional economic development in China. 
The fourth section is an econometric analysis of the theories presented in this paper.  
Some concluding remarks are provided at the last section. 
 
II.  An Overview of the Evolution of China’s Regional Development Policies
3 
 
When the PRC was founded in 1949, the military chaos of the Japanese occupation 
and during World War II had ended and China as a nation was again ruled by a single 
central government.  There were substantial gaps in development levels among the 
provinces and regions at that time.
4 Data from 28 provinces
5 in 1952 show that the 
average per capita GDP was 134.89 yuan with a coefficient of variance
6  of 0.59 (see 
Figure 2). Shanghai had the highest per capita GDP of 436 yuan, while Guizhou had 
                                                                                                                                                               
2  The concept of viability will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper. 
3  The data in this subsection are from the State Statistical Bureau’s Comprehensive Statistical Data and Material 
on Fifty Years of New China, (Beijing: China Statistical Press, 1999). 
4  China has a long history of regional disparities in economic  development.  The  Chinese civilization originated 
in the Yellow River area, so since early in China’s history, a high concentration of economic centers emerged along 
the Yellow River.    During the Song Dynasty, these economic centers began to move south, and major agricultural 
crops changed.    Manufacturing in the modern sense started with the Importing Foreign Industry Initiative (လༀ
ᄎ׮) in the 1850s, but rather than real comprehensive industrialization, this Initiative was rather selective and 
aimed simply to build factories in riverbank and coastal areas with good transportation conditions.    At the end of 
the 19
th century, most of China’s industry was located in the southeast, coastal regions, with 64% of all factories in 
China being in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Wuhan. During the ten-year period after World War I (1928-1937), 
China’s national industries experienced rapid development and quickly boosted the growth of the national 
economy.    In this period, the economy pursued a new trend, and heavy industries in the northeast developed 
quickly, giving rise to industrial centers appearing in cities like Tianjin and Qingdao. When the anti-Japanese war 
broke out, some important industrial facilities were relocated to the southwestern regions, and this movement 
actually helped economic development in those  regions.  However,  generally,  the southeastern areas continued to 
lead the other areas in economic development.    From World War II until the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China, regional disparities in economic development existed. 
5  Data for Hainan and Xizang (Tibet) are not available; and data for Chongqing is included in that for Sichuan. 
6  The coefficient of variance is calculated by dividing the standard variance by the mean value.  7














Figure 2: Per capita GDP and Consumption Expenditure in China’s Provinces in 1952 
 
For the purpose of nation building, the Chinese government adopted a heavy 
industry-oriented development strategy in its first five-year plan in 1953, focusing on 
the construction of 156 major projects with the assistance of the Soviet Union. 
Notably, due to security considerations, many of these projects were located in the 
northwest and southwest regions. In fact, among the 156 key projects, only one-fifth 
were in coastal areas.   
In the second five-year plan (1958-1962), the government increased its 
investment in the coastal areas to explore more fully the development potential of the 
Yangtze River delta region—with Shanghai at the helm—and of the coastal areas of 
northern China. The period of the third five-year plan  (1966-1970)  included yet 
another strategic reallocation of China's industrial investments.    As part of increased 
military preparedness, the central government adopted a strategy of “Third Line 
Development” and concentrated major construction projects in Sichuan, Guizhou, 


































































































































































































































the government slowed its investment in these areas and required each province to 
improve industrial self-sufficiency.    This change, combined with the discovery of oil 
in the east, prompted a resurgence of investments in the coastal provinces.  This 
increased coastal investment continued into the early 1970s, especially after the 
improvement of US-China relations.   
According to standard neo-classical economic theories, intensive investment in 
the central and western areas, especially in the third-line regions, should have brought 
about economic development in those areas.    The actual outcome, however, was very 
different.  Before the reforms in 1978, economic development levels in the central 
and western areas remained behind those in the eastern areas.    In 1978, Shanghai had 
the highest per capita GDP at 2,498 yuan, a figure 14.28 times higher than per capita 
GDP in Guizhou (see Figure 3).  Besides the three municipalities directly under the 
central government (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai), Liaoning had the highest per 
capita GDP of 680 yuan, a figure 3.89 times that of Guizhou. In 1978, the average 
overall provincial per capita GDP was 467.57 yuan with a variance of 0.96, much 
































































































































































































































































In the autumn of 1978, the Chinese government initiated the reform and 
liberalization policies. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the new policy 
allowed some people and some regions to get rich first.
7 The sixth and seventh 
five-year plans (1981-85, 1986-90) strategically declared that more concentrated 
development efforts would be allotted to the most promising growth regions.  Thus, 
many areas along China’s eastern coast enjoyed significant increases in investments.     
An important change in fiscal policy also occurred at this time.  Starting in  
1980, the government began to replace the old fiscal system of “unified revenue and 
expenditure” by a decentralized fiscal responsibility system, giving partial   
autonomy to each province for the purpose of enhancing each province’s incentives to 
increase revenues and reduce expenditures.   
By the late 1980s, the increased development investments in the coastal regions 
had yielded significant gains, but relative backwardness in the central and western 
areas became a challenge.    To address this problem, the government entered the next 
decade emphasizing “balanced regional economic development” in its long-term 
development strategies. The “Ninth Five-Year Plan and Long-Term Prospects for 
2010,” adopted in 1996, suggested several measures to narrow regional disparities, 
giving more infrastructure investments and international development agencies’ loans 
to the central and western regions. At the end of the 1990s, the government adopted 
the Western Development Strategy to promote the development of hinterland 
provinces. Accompanyng changes in regional development policies were a reform of 
fiscal relations between the central and local governments in 1994, including the 
implementation of a tax-sharing system and the establishment of a uniform income 
tax for all domestic enterprises. 
  
III. Viability and the Effects of the Leap-Forward Strategy on Regional 
Disparities 
                                                        
7  In a conference held in March 1980 to discuss long-term plans, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that we should “use 
our comparative advantages, avoid using our disadvantages and accepting the fact of economic disparities, …, 
some people and some regions should be allowed to get rich first and in the end everyone will get rich,” (Mengkui 
Wang et al. 2000: p. 266).  10
The priority given to the development of heavy industries before the reform 
resulted in intensive investments in the central and western regions. However, those 
investments profoundly failed to bring about a corresponding increase in per capita 
GDP and per worker GDP in these regions. In fact, the widening of regional income 
disparities after the reforms also related to the above pattern of investments in the 
central and western regions.   
 
In analyzing the impact of development strategies on economic performance, Lin 
(2003) formally defines the term “viability” as follows: 
 
If, without any external subsidies or protections, a normally managed enterprise is 
expected to earn a socially acceptable profit in a free, open, and competitive market, 
the enterprise is viable.  Otherwise, the enterprise is nonviable. [need page number 
for direct quotation] 
 
In the same paper Lin also categorizes development strategies in developing 
countries into two mutually exclusive groups: (i) the comparative advantage-defying 
(CAD) strategy, which attempts to encourage firms that ignore the existing comparative 
advantages of the economy in their entry/choice of industry/technology; and (ii) the 
comparative advantage-following (CAF) strategy, which attempts to facilitate firms’ 
entry/choice of industry/technology according to the economy’s existing comparative 
advantages. 
The concept of viability seems to be trivial in the context of neo-classical 
economics because there is a belief in the neo-classical economics that, if an 
enterprise in the long term does not expect to earn a socially acceptable profit, the 
enterprise will not be set up or will be driven out of the competitive market.
8  
However, if a government adopts a CAD strategy, encouraging enterprises in the 
economy to ignore the existing comparative advantages of the economy in their 
entry/choice of industry/technology, these enterprises will not be viable in an open, free, 
                                                        
8  Of course, it is not unusual that during the early period of an investment, net cash flow is negative, but the sum 
of discounted expected net profit over the whole investment period must be non-negative. In fact, the neo-classical  11
competitive market (Lin 2003).   
The leap-forward, heavy industry-oriented development strategy, adopted by the 
Chinese government since the first five-year plan, is a typical CAD strategy. The 
construction of heavy industries following this strategy required (1) long gestation 
periods, (2) importation of foreign equipment, and (3) large amounts of capital 
investment for each project. However, because China was a poor, agrarian economy at 
the time the leap-forward strategy was adopted, the availability of capital, foreign 
reserves, and investment funds were all limited. These capital-intensive enterprises 
that emerged from the leap-forward strategy did not conform to the capital-scarce 
endowment structure in China and would not have been viable in a competitive 
market.  To establish and ensure survival of these enterprises, the Chinese 
government established a tripartite system, including a macro environment with 
distorted factor and product prices, a planned and administrative resource allocation 
mechanism, and a micromanagement institution characterized by the nationalization 
of enterprises (Lin et al. 1994 and 1999). 
The viability problem endogenous to the leap-forward strategy and the 
corresponding tripartite economic system had direct impacts on increasing regional 
disparities in economic development before the reforms.  There are several reasons 
for this. 
First, launching many highly capital-intensive projects in the central and western 
areas requires large initial investments. From the statistical data alone, one may infer 
such an investment pattern as attempting to narrow the gap of regional development 
between the developed coastal region and backward hinterland region (Yang 1990). 
However, only a limited portion of these investments became productive capital. And 
even these capital investments were quite specialized for certain production purposes 
and had no externality on the local economies.
9  
Second, many of China’s leap-forward projects required huge inputs of natural 
                                                                                                                                                               
economic theories presume the viability of firms.   
9  This is because the industry and technology of those priority projects were too intensive in capital and the local 
economies were too scarce in capital. Therefore, it would be difficult to transfer the technology in the priority 
projects to the local enterprises.  12
resources, raw minerals and raw products, which were produced mostly in the central 
and western regions. For the purpose of subsidizing those projects, the government 
arbitrarily depressed prices of these goods. The central and western regions were in 
effect subsidizing the leap-forward projects. Therefore, many construction projects in 
the central and western areas not only did not help economic development in these 
areas, but actually hampered it. 
Third, although the government injected a lot of capital into the priority projects, 
these projects could create only limited employment opportunities for the highly 
educated labor force coming mainly from the developed coastal region. The local 
labor force was restricted to low productivity agriculture. Consequently, the 
indigenous local people’s incomes remained low. 
Because of the traditional system’s low efficiency, China started a piece-meal 
gradual approach to reforming the economy at the end of 1978. The reforms first 
increased the autonomy of micro-agents, farmers and managers of state-owned 
enterprises, and then gradually the reforms extended to the resource allocation system 
and to the macro policy environment (Lin et al. 1994 and 1999).   
The gradual approach to reform enabled China to start the reforms smoothly and 
to have steady progress while avoiding the high costs of tumultuous social change in 
the reform process. But a gradual approach in reform also means that different regions 
are not equal in grasping opportunities for regional development.  Areas impacted 
the most by the leap-forward strategies faced very challenging and more numerous 
difficulties and required longer periods of time to accomplish the transition because 
the viability problems of most of their state-owned enterprises (SOEs) turned from 
implicit to explicit.  On the other hand, those areas left relatively untouched by the 
leap-forward strategies enjoyed a much faster transition because fewer of their 
enterprises were burdened by viability problems. 
For the purpose of subsidizing non-viable SOEs, the government continues to 
suppress the prices of raw materials and resource products. Suppliers of raw materials 
and resource products are mainly in the central and western areas. As the coastal 
provinces grow with the reforms, they import more of these resources from the central  13
and western provinces. Therefore, the relatively backward central and western regions 
are subsidizing the growth of the relatively wealthy eastern region, causing the 
regional disparities to widen. Moreover, the required subsidies to the non-viable SOEs 
in the central and western areas have caused many problems of soft budget constraints 
(Lin et al. 1997 and Lin and Tan 1999), further depressing the economic efficiency in 
the central and western regions.   
The non-viability of many SOEs is the key issue in China’s reforms čLin, Cai and 
Li 1998; Lin and Tan 1999Ď. However, the government, both at the central and local 
levels, continues to pay insufficient attention to this problem.  In assessing the 
political achievements of local leaders, the central government emphasizes 
technological advancement and gross and net production increases.    Therefore, local 
leaders often make decisions that disregard market signals and continue to pursue the 
leap forward strategy.    Fortunately, China’s recent ascension to the WTO has limited 
the government’s ability to protect/subsidize non-viable enterprises and has made all 
levels of government aware of the importance of following the principle of 
comparative advantages in developing the economy. 
 
IV. Regional Disparities: An Empirical Analysis 
 
1.  A Framework for Empirical Analysis 
In order to offer deeper insights about the influence of development strategies on a 
region’s economic development, we now present a rigorous econometric analysis.  
According to neoclassical growth theories (Solow 1956 and Barro 1991), an economy 
that has lower initial per capita income will have a higher potential growth rate due to 
diminishing returns in capital, leading to economic convergence.   
However, neoclassical growth theories ignore the influence of economic structure, 
which is determined by the characteristics of development strategies, on growth.  As 
discussed earlier, if a less developed economy adopts a comparative advantage-defying 
(CAD), leap-forward strategy, its pace of economic growth will be hampered and its 
real growth rate prevented from reaching its full potential.    14
Lin (2003) constructs a technology choice index  (TCI) to measure the 
characteristics of the development strategy in an economy.  The idea behind the 
variable is as follows: 
If an economy adopts a comparative advantage-following strategy (CAF), that is, 
all enterprises follow the economy’s comparative advantage to choose their industries, 
products and technologies, the actual capital/labor ratio of the economy’s 
manufacturing industry is endogenously determined by the capital/labor ratio of the 
whole economy.  That is, the optimal capital intensity of the economy’s 
manufacturing sector, Ki/Li, can be described as a function of the economy’s capital 
endowment, K, and labor endowment, L.     




















To measure an economy’s deviation from the CAF strategy, we construct the 
statistical indicator, TCI, the actual technology choice index of the manufacturing 
sector, which is defined as the actual capital/labor ratio of an economy’s 
manufacturing industry divided by the capital/labor ratio of the whole economy.  
That is, 






i i =  
A government’s choice of a development strategy will influence the economy’s TCI 
value. 
We then define the optimal technology choice index of the manufacturing sector, 
TCI*.  Conducting the first-order Taylor expansion of Equation (1) at K/L=0 and 
ignoring the higher order terms, we obtain Equation (3), where ω is a constant, 
denoting the derivative value of Equation (1) at point K/L=0,
10 


















i ω  
                                                        
10  K/L=0 means that the economy has no capital stock.    Obviously, the optimal capital labor ratio in the 
manufacturing industry is zero.    Equation (1) is a curve starting from the original point.    ȼ  is the tangent 
slope of this curve at the original point.    15
Obviously, the higher the capital/labor ratio an economy has, the higher the optimal 
capital/labor ratio of its manufacturing sector.  That is,ω >0b Until now, we have 
defined the optimal technology choice index 
* TCI  asğ 








i i  
Given the endowment structure of an economy, 
* TCI  is the optimal TCI.
11We can 
measure the government’s deviation from the CAF strategy indirectly as follows: 
) 5 ..( .......... ..........
* ω − = − = TCI TCI TCI DS  
If a country or area follows the CAF strategy, then DS=0. If the government adopts a 
CAD strategy to promote its capital-intensive industries, we expect DS>0.  The 
larger the value of  DS , the stronger the CAD strategy.    Furthermore, givenω đthe 
larger the value of  TCI , the stronger the CAD strategy. 
From the above discussion, we construct the following econometric equation: 
) 6 ....( ) ( 2 , 0 1 0 i i i i u X DS GDPPL Ln G + + ⋅ + ⋅ + = ψ α α α  
In Equation (6), G i , the dependent variable, is the average annual growth rate of per 
worker GDP of each province from 1978 to 2000.   ) ( , 0 i GDPPL Ln   is the initial per 
worker GDP of each province in 1978, representing the initial level of development.  
According to the analysis we conducted before, if the convergence exists,  1 α  is  expect 
to be negative, and  2 α , the coefficient of DS, is expected to be negative, too. 
Because the optimal  ω =
* TCI  is not observable, we cannot calculate the 
value of  i DS  directly.  However, ω  is a constant.  We can therefore rearrange 
Equation (6) into Equation (6£), which will be used in the regression. 
) ' 6 ..( ) ( ' 2 , 0 1 i i i k i u X TCI GDPPL Ln C G + + ⋅ + ⋅ + = ψ α α  
In Equation (6£)đ ω α α 2 0 − = ′ k C , we expect the coefficient of  i TCI ,  2 α , to be 
                                                        
11  In addition to factor endowments, TCI* is expected to be affected by the stage of development of an economy 
and the relative abundance of natural resource in an economy.    We do not consider these factors here.    16
negative. 
In Equations  č6Ďand (6£) , X denotes other explanatory variables, which we 
will describe in detail later. 
 
2.  Variables and the Data Resources 
For the measurement of  i TCI , please refer to the work of the development 
strategy research group of the China Center for Economic Research (2002).
12  In  fact, 
i TCI   reflects the characteristics of industries, products and the technology structure 
of each province.  We have annual observations of  i TCI  for each year in the 
period 1978-1999 for each province.  In order to describe the characteristics of the 
development strategies for the whole period, we will use the arithmetical average of 
i TCI   for 1978-1999 and denote it , TCI7899.  
In addition, we also define another indicator of development strategies, TCI7885, 
which is the arithmetical average value of  i TCI   from 1978-1985, in order to capture 
the characteristics of development strategies of each province in the initial stage of the 
reform.
13 
In Equation (6£), the explanatory variable X differs under different situations. 
According to neoclassical growth theory, the stronger the propensity to save in an 
economy, the higher the per worker output in the steady state.  Therefore, the 
differences in saving propensities between economies lead to different rates of 
convergence.  To be specific, a higher savings propensity leads to a higher income 
level in the steady state. Therefore, the higher the saving rate, the larger the income 
gap between the initial income level and the steady state income level and the fast the 
                                                        
12  The overnment’s heavy-industry-oriented strategy can only absorb limited amounts of labor.    Out of a concern for 
social stability, social policies always impose on firms the burden of absorbing excess labor.  Therefore, firms 
hire more employees than are needed, and one person’s work has to be assigned to three persons.    This practice is 
not in accordance to the concept of a technology-driven leap-forward strategy that pursues priority development in 
capital-intensive industries. Behind the appearance of high employment is a reality of large numbers of hidden 
–unemployed workers.   
 
13 The amount of labor that we use here to calculate the TCI index is larger than the real (or efficient) labor 
amount employed.  Thus, per worker capital possession is underestimated.  That is, the TCI index we get is 
overestimated.  Nevertheless,  this  fact only strengthens our conclusion.  17
growth rate. Savings propensity is expressed as ( i SAV ) and is expected to have a 
positive sign.  We use Mankiw’s approachčMankiw et al. 1992Ďand define the 
















where the numerator denotes fixed capital and inventory investment
14 
15, while the 
denominator denotes current GDP.    Both are measured in current prices. 
In addition, in the neoclassical growth theory model, the greater the increases in 
the rates of labor, the lower the per worker income in the steady state tends to be.  
According to a principle similar to that of the propensity to save, we introduce the rate 
of labor increases in each province as an explanatory variable (denoted as  i LABG ).  
This variable is expected to have a negative sign   
Human capital is included as an explanatory variable in most studies of economic 
convergence.  However, each researcher has a different definition of human capital.  
In this paper, we take the initial level of each province’s human capital as an 
independent variable (denoted by  i HUMK82 ), which is defined as the proportion 
of individuals who had completed primary school by 1982.   
Capital inflow, especially foreign direct investment, FDI, often brings with it new 
technology and management čLee 1994 and Dayal-Gulati and Husain 2000Ď.  
Therefore, the more FDI inflow (denoted by FDIi ) into a province, the more 
advantages it has in technology progress.  The measurement of FDI we use in our  
econometric analysis is the natural logarithm of total FDI from 1978-2000.
16  We 
                                                        
14 Here we neglect the influences of government surplus and net export on savings.  The relationship between 
these factors and productive capital is, after all, relatively weak. 
15  In fact, the definition of “savings index” here is not very satisfying.    In a neoclassical framework, the savings 
propensity refers to voluntarily savings, and all savings become investments. The savings index in the study can 
also be used to represent the rate of investment.    And once we take this index as the rate of investment, the policy 
implication from the study should be treated carefully.  After all, the mechanism of voluntary savings and 
automatic transforming from savinsg to investments is totally different from the mechanism that a government 
uses to create a deficit budget to expand investments. 
16  Strictly speaking, foreign direct investment can take various forms, including cash, technology, physical capital, 
etc.  The definition of gross investment in national accounts is not exactly identical to the meaning of foreign 
direct investment.  Therefore, the method in most research that uses the ratio of FDI over gross investment 
value to describe the impact of foreign investment upon economic growth is not very proper.  In our opinion, 
from the perspective of technological progress, to use the absolute volume of foreign investment is a better  18
expect the coefficient of FDI to be positive. 
Additionally, plenty of empirical research supports the point that China has 
experienced economic convergence since the reforms (Jian et al. 1996; Fang, and 
Yang 2000; Tsui 1991, 1993; World Bank 1995đ 1997; Zhang, Liu and Yao 2001; Aziz 
and Duenwald 2001). Stretching across a vast territory, China displays great 
disparities between regions in natural conditions and market capacities.  In order to 
control these factors, we introduce two dummy variables denoting the central and 
western areas of China.
17  
Neoclassical growth theory ignores the structure of the economy.  Realizing the 
disadvantageous consequences of this omission, Barro attempts to remedy this 
deficiency in his empirical testing of neoclassical growth theory.  A variable 
denoting the impact on structure was introduced into the regression analysis of 
economic convergence in U.S regions. The impact variable is the sum of industrial 
growth rates on the national level weighted by the share of each industry in each state 
(Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1991 and 1992).  The variable reflects the neoclassical 
growth theory’s present view on economic structure.  Theoretically, Barro’s 
understanding of the impact of structure focuses on the demand side.   Although it is 
understandable to consider the impact of demand on economic growth, Barro’s 
understanding of the impact of economic structure on growth  violates a basic 
principle of economics.  For instance, suppose industries grow quickly on the 
national level, but some provinces have comparative advantages in agriculture.  
Then the smaller share of industry in the agricultural provinces is not necessarily 
negative and unfavorable to growth.  In other words, that different regions have 
different output structures is the result of differences in regional comparative 
advantages and the free movement of products and factors.  Following the CAF 
strategy does not require each industry’s growth rate in each region to be equal to the 
                                                                                                                                                               
choice than is the ratio mentioned above.  Of course, in using this definition, we implicitly assume that all 
technological progress advantages from FDI occur at the initial stage of the investment.  In fact, 
foreign-invested enterprises might share further information about the parent company’s R&D in the future.  
That is to say, one-time FDI brings about continued technological progress advantages that may not initially be 
fully quantifiable. 
17Here, data for Sichuan includes that for Chongqing, as systematic data for Chongqing as an independent entity 
could not be obtained. Systematic data for Tibet and Hainan are also not available, so these two are not included.    19
national growth rate, because the comparative advantages in each area are different 
and change constantly. 
Certainly, in a mature market economy such as exists in the U.S., the patterns of 
industry specialization between states have conformed to the regional comparative 
advantages over a relatively long period of time.  Therefore, Barro’s understanding 
of the impact of structure can be regarded as the impact of demand in the short run.  
In other words, in the U.S., this variable is appropriate for describing the short- run 
demand impact. However, in the case of China, because of the poor match between 
the economic structure and the comparative advantages in each region, this variable is 
inappropriate.  Industry  has  undoubtedly  increased most rapidly on the national level 
in China since 1978.  But some provinces, especially those in central or western 
areas, do not always have comparative advantages in industry.  Therefore, 
specializing in the development of such comparative advantage-defying heavy 
industry will not accelerate growth but will hinder it. 
Wei (1997) adopted the impact on structure variable defined by Barro in his 
empirical research.
18 We use data from 1978-2000 from 29 provinces in China to 
calculate the impact of structure variable as defined by Barro and include it in the 
regression.
19  Table 3 summarizes the data set that we used in our econometric 
analysis. 
Cheng (2002) pointed out that the regression results of regional convergence in 
China are highly sensitive to the choice of samples.  To be specific, whether to 
regard Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai as independent economies or integrate them into 
                                                        
18  In many other studies on regional economic development in China, various kinds of structure variables are 
included.    Cheng (2002) included an explanatory variable, the ratio of non-agricultural GDP to total GDP, to 
describe the influence of economic structure in the normal Barro regression. Similarly, Jian and others (Jian et al. 
1996) used initial agricultural shares.    Actually, Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991) used the structural variable of 
agricultural production over total state GDP in their analysis of regional convergence of states in the U.S. before 
1929.    Shen and others (Shen and Ma. 2002) used a so-called industrialization index – the ratio of provincial 
industrial production over national total industrial production.    Fang and others (Fang, Wang, and Yang 2001) 
also introduced a structural variable to describe the influence of the degree of maturity ofthe    markets: the 
comparative productivity of agricultural labor.    The definition of this index is the proportion of agricultural 
production over the proportions of agricultural labor.    However, they did not say whether the proportions used 
there were set against the national total or the provincial total. 
19  Based on available data, when calculating structural variables, we divide the national economy into the primary 
industry, manufacturing, construction and building, trade and retailing, transportation and other tertiary industries.   
There are altogether six sectors. 
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their respective surrounding provinces will lead to different conclusions. For example, 
Tsui (1996) included Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai data in provincial data, and his 
conclusion supported the argument for regional income divergence in China since the 
reforms.  Other studies that support the regional convergence position are all based 
on methods that treat these three cities as independent economies.  In this paper, we 
present both cases in our analysis.   
The residual in Equation (6£) is assumed to be heteroscedastic, that is, 
i u Var u E ς σ
2 ) ( , 0 ) ( = = .  Under this assumption, the regressions are carried out by 
White’s method of robustness variance-covariance matrix. 
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Table3ğData set for empirical analysis 
Province 
(city,section) 
Gi, the average 
annual growth 









































Anhui  0.0730  6.4107 6.1704  10.5070 0.3815    0.0294  0.4834  12.627  1 0 0.0628   
Beijing  0.0789  7.8043 2.5433 3.8859 0.4032    0.0148  0.7780  14.164  0 0 0.0886   
Fujian  0.0981  6.5764 3.8099 6.4157 0.3957    0.0297  0.5525  15.024  0 0 0.0698   
Gansu  0.0492  6.8381 8.8154 8.6895 0.3587    0.0366  0.4674  10.794  0 1 0.0790   
Guangdong  0.1017  6.7051 3.2347 4.0162 0.2610    0.0262  0.6592  16.091  0 0 0.0736   
guangxi  0.0615  6.2556 6.2663 6.9535 0.3203    0.0267  0.6147  13.366  0 1 0.0677   
Guizhou  0.0599  6.0923 7.7422  11.8262 0.1714    0.0290  0.4358  10.604  0 1 0.0658   
Hebei  0.0781  6.7660 3.8184 5.2152 0.2948    0.0232  0.6365  13.606  0 0 0.0598   
Henan  0.0704  6.3619 5.3099 7.7140 0.3600    0.0298  0.5702  12.996  1 0 0.0745   
Helongjiang  0.0515  7.4594  3.4011  5.1687  0.3383   0.0229  0.6781  12.818  1 0 0.0672  
Hubei  0.0742  6.6726 5.0769 6.9841 0.4250    0.0205  0.6251  13.364  1 0 0.0773   
Hunan  0.0655  6.4688  5.9411  8.9617  0.4197   0.0227  0.6733  13.167  1 0 0.0666  
Jilin  0.0647  7.1470  4.0611  4.7230  0.4366   0.0298  0.6851  12.602  1 0 0.0667  
Jiangsu  0.1062  6.7994 2.9713 4.6113 0.4708    0.0131  0.6028  15.298  1 0 0.0741   
Jiangxi  0.0748  6.5419 4.6175 5.7546 0.3665    0.0248  0.5784  12.505  0 0 0.0750   
Liaoning  0.0611  7.5108 3.3617 4.3924 0.3084    0.0192  0.7364  14.192  1 0 0.0659   
Neimeng  0.0714  6.7902 5.1472 7.0115 0.3575    0.0223  0.6009  10.506  0 0 0.0827   
Ningxia  0.0533  6.8653 3.3853 3.6154 0.1916    0.0330  0.4718 9.975  1 0 0.0719   
Qinghai  0.0439  6.9790 5.2507 4.8027 0.2359    0.0272  0.4558 8.645  0 1 0.0776   
Shandong  0.0836  6.6321 4.2107 6.1633 0.3703    0.0278  0.5767  14.560  0 1 0.0771   
Shanxi  0.0672  6.8153 3.9497 4.9722 0.3097    0.0195  0.6874  11.924  0 0 0.0712   
Shaanxi  0.0657  6.6228 4.5893 6.4586 0.2764    0.0250  0.6076  12.630  1 0 0.0794   
Shanghai  0.0836  8.2704 1.7581 2.4050 0.2754    0.0077  0.7706  14.940  0 1 0.0728   
Tianjin  0.0771  7.7204 1.9893 2.2888 0.2379    0.0136  0.7491  14.132  0 0 0.0893   
Xinjiang  0.0827  6.6787 4.6238 6.3387 0.2755    0.0172  0.5839  10.562  0 0 0.0884   
Yunnan  0.0663  6.2648 6.4853 7.4401 0.2122    0.0258  0.4269  11.808  0 1 0.0693   
Zhejiang  0.1048  6.5356 2.1395 2.6067 0.4214    0.0183  0.6284  13.929  0 1 0.0650   
Sichuan  0.0586  6.3922 4.3966 6.1308 0.3366    0.0194  0.6133  13.051  0 0 0.0684   
Noteğ(1)Hainan is not included in the table because its data for TCI is not available. In the regressions, Hainan is not included.   22 
(2)TCI7899 is the average of annual TCI for the period in 1978-1999ĠTCI7885 is the average for the period 1978-1985. 
 
Data source: Nominal and real GDP index from 1978 to 1998 are available in the “Collection of Statistical Data for 50 Years since 1949” (Department of 
National Economic Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics, 1999).    Nominal and real GDP indices from 1999 to 2001 are available in annual 
books of provincial statistics.  From these statistics, time series data for real GDP in 1978 prices can be derived.  Data for employment use in Gi 
and Ln(GDPPL0) are also taken from the above-mentioned sources.    Data for foreign direct investment are from China’s annual statistics books.  
Data for the proportion of population possessing higher than rudimentary education over the total population in 1982 (which represents human 
capital) are available in the 1985 “Annual Book of Chinese Demography,” (pages 614-615) from the editing room of the Annual Book of Chinese 
Demography of the Demography Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Social Science.    Savings rate data for provinces are derived from the 
above data by dividing nominal capital formation data by nominal GDP data.  23
3.  Results of the econometric analysis 
We report the regression results in Table 4 through Table 6. 
Table 4 includes estimated results of the eight models. Model I uses the 
framework of neoclassical unconditional convergence. The result from this model 
does not support the unconditional convergence hypothesis. Moreover, the adjusted R
2 
shows that the goodness of fit is not good.    In Model II and Model III, we include the 
development strategies of each province in the initial stage of reform, TCI7885, and 
during the whole period of the reform, TCI7899.    From the estimated results of these 
two models, we see that the stronger the leap-forward characteristics in the 
development strategies, the slower the increase in the per worker GDP.  In addition, 
the sign of the coefficient of the initial per worker GDP has the expected negative 
sign. 
Model IV through Model VIII are based on a framework of conditional 
convergence.    The coefficients of the development strategy variables in these models 
are all significantly negative.    However, the initial per worker GDP has the expected 
negative sign but is not significant in some cases. The signs of other explanatory 
variables’ coefficients, such as savings rates, rates of labor increases and FDI, are all 
as expected, however the significance of the variables is unstable.    The coefficient of 
the human capital variable has an unexpected negative sign, and, in some cases, is 
highly significant.  Of course, we cannot draw the general conclusion that human 
capital and per worker GDP are negatively related. 
The eight models used to derive the results in Table 5 are the same models used in 
Table 4 except that we add another two dummy variables denoting central and western 
areas in Table 5.    The inclusion of these two dummies clearly enhances the goodness 
of fit of all models, and the estimates for the initial per worker GDP are negative and 
highly significant in all models. This result indicates the existence of neoclassical 
convergence in China. From the regional dummies in Table 5, we can see that the 
growth rate of per worker GDP for provinces in the central region is significantly 
lower than in the provinces in the eastern region and higher than the provinces in the 
western regions, which reflects the influence of natural conditions and other   24
unobservable regional characteristics on economic growth.  The influence of 
development strategies has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant in 
all cases. These results indicate that the leap-forward development strategy is 
detrimental to an increase of per worker GDP.   
Table 6 shows the results of nine models, in which the structure impact variables 
defined by Barro are introduced.  As shown, none of the estimates for the structural 
impact variables are statistically significant. In sharp contrast to Barro’s structure 
impact variables, the estimates for the development strategy variables are, as expected, 
negative and statistically significant in all models.   
The regression results for the data set excluding the three municipalities are 
similar to those including the three municipalities. The results are not reported here 
but can be obtained by contacting the authors directly.   
The regression results strongly support our hypothesis that if a province follows 
a CAD strategy, causing its TCI to deviate from ω , i.e. the optimal TCI
*, the per 
worker GDP growth rate in the province will be reduced significantly. Tables 4 
through 6 show that the estimates for TCI7899 ranged between –0.0028 and -.00084 
and most estimates are about –0.003. If we take –0.003 as the appropriate estimate for 
TCI7899, this means that with a unit deviation from  ω , the per worker GDP growth 
rate will be reduced by 0.3% per year over the 1978-1999 period. The fourth column 
in Table 3 reports the TCI7899 for each province. The exact value of  ω  is  unknown. 
The second column in Table 3 shows that Jiangsu province has the highest per worker 
GDP growth rates among all provinces in China. If we take Jiangsu’s TCI7899, which 
is 2.9713, as ω , we can infer the impact of the development strategy on each 
province’s growth. For example, Guizhou’s TCI7899 is 7.7422, so its DS [query: 
define DS???] is 4.7709. Therefore, Guizhou’s per worker GDP growth rate was 
reduced 1.43% per year over the period in 1978-1999.     25 
Table 4: Regression Results   
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII  Model VIII 
Constant  0.0703 0.1807 0.2267 0.0746 0.1281 0.2123 0.1413 0.2258 
  (0.0290) (0.0587) (0.0502) (0.0478) (0.0503) (0.0474) (0.0497) (0.0477) 
  [0.0224]** [0.0050]***  [0.0001]***  [0.1330]  [0.0188]** [0.0002]***  [0.0098]***  [0.0001]*** 
LnčGDPPL0Ď  0.0003 -0.0123 -0.0171 -0.0039 -0.0089 -0.0161 -0.0087 -0.0152 
  (0.0042) (0.0073) (0.0063) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0082) (0.0052) (0.0076) 
 [0.9436]  [0.1038]  [0.0113]**  [0.4712]  [0.1223] [0.0626]* [0.1098] [0.0573]* 
TCI7885   -0.0042    -0.0024  -0.0033    
   (0.0017)    (0.0008)  (0.0014)    
   [0.0200]**     [0.0049]***  [0.0252]**    
TCI7899     -0.0084      -0.0047  -0.0071 
     (0.0020)      (0.0012)  (0.0021) 
     [0.0003]***      [0.0006]***  [0.0026]*** 
SAVE        0.0313 0.0395 0.0714 0.0394 0.0660 
        (0.0244) (0.0209) (0.0330) (0.0203) (0.0293) 
      [0.2124]  [0.0732]*  [0.0415]**  [0.0656]*  [0.0348]** 
LABG        -1.2078 -1.0894 -1.1571 -0.8746 -0.7890 
        (0.4221) (0.3777) (0.4901) (0.3689) (0.5323) 
      [0.0078]***  [0.0089]***  [0.0275]**  [0.0274]**  [0.1525] 
HUMK82        -0.0786 -0.0855 -0.0119 -0.0887 -0.0349 
        (0.0269) (0.0249) (0.0506) (0.0196) (0.0424) 
      [0.0078]***  [0.0025]***  [0.8157]  [0.0002]***  [0.4181] 
FDI       0.0070  0.0065  0.0056  
      (0.0016)  (0.0015)    (0.0015)   
      [0.0003]***  [0.0004]***    [0.0012]***   
Adjusted R
2  -0.0384 0.1214 0.4022 0.5836 0.6330 0.3271 0.6717 0.4715 
Explanationsğ č1ĎThe figure in the parentheses under each estimate parameter is the standard deviation of the estimation; the square brackets below shows the p 
value of the t-test against the zero hypotheses that “the parameter is significantly not zero ”. This is the same for all other OLS estimation below. 
č2ĎAs we assume that the random disturbance has heteroscedasticity, we made certain adjustments in OLS estimation. The standard deviation of the 
estimation reported in the table is from White’s robust variance and covariance matrix.    All following OLS estimations are adjusted similarly. 
č3ĎFor eas of interpretation, we denote the case where the p-value of the two-tailed t-test is less than 1% with “***”; we denote the cases where the 
p-values are between 1% and 5% with “**”; and denote the cases where the p-value is between 5% and 10% with “*”.     26 
Table 5:    Regression Results (including Regional Dummies) 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII  Model VIII 
Constant  0.1976 0.2354 0.2389 0.2100 0.2333 0.2723 0.2244 0.2609 
  (0.0268) (0.0316) (0.0304) (0.0414) (0.0385) (0.0285) (0.0421) (0.0307) 
  [0.0000]*** [0.0002]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** 
LnčGDPPL0Ď  -0.0152 -0.0195 -0.0196 -0.0146 -0.0166 -0.0200 -0.0155 -0.0186 
  (0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0046) 
  [0.0005]*** [0.0002]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0006]*** 
TCI7885   -0.0018    -0.0017  -0.0039    
   (0.0006)    (0.0006)  (0.0013)    
   [0.0103]**    [0.0105]**  [0.0074]***     
TCI7899     -0.0035      -0.0029  -0.0028 
     (0.0014)      (0.0012)  (0.0013) 
     [0.0179]**      [0.0263]**  [0.0350]** 
SAVE        0.0104 0.0142 0.0161 0.0199 0.0218 
        (0.0212) (0.0178) (0.0196) (0.0209) (0.0224) 
        [0.6292] [0.4361] [0.4212] [0.3504] [0.3428] 
LABG        -1.0148 -0.9867 -0.9342 -0.8428 -0.7981 
      (0.3483)  (0.3316)  (0.3415)  (0.3112)  (0.3266) 
      [0.0086]***  [0.0078]***  [0.0128]**  [0.0140]**  [0.0239]** 
HUMK82        -0.0427 -0.0577 -0.0328 -0.0557 -0.0343 
        (0.0281) (0.0286) (0.0285) (0.0259) (0.0268) 
      [0.1445]  [0.0581]*  [0.2643]  [0.0442]**  [0.2143] 
FDI       0.0019  0.0023  0.0020  
      (0.0017)  (0.0018)    (0.0017)   
      [0.2819]  [0.2115]    [0.2459]   
Dummy  for  central  areas -0.0258 -0.0230 -0.0211 -0.0184 -0.0148 -0.0206 -0.0148 -0.0198 
  (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0041) (0.0058) (0.0045)   27 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII  Model VIII 
  [0.0000]***  [0.0000]***  [0.0002]***  [0.0034]*** [0.0158]** [0.0001]*** [0.0202]** [0.0003]*** 
Dummy  for  western  areas  -0.0377 -0.0352 -0.0303 -0.0287 -0.0257 -0.0326 -0.0229 -0.0289 
  (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0072) (0.0062) (0.0085) (0.0073) 
  [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0002]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0020]*** [0.0000]***  [0.0142]**  [0.0007]*** 
Adjusted R
2  0.6596 0.6794 0.7070 0.7080 0.7279 0.7239 0.7320 0.7315 
   28 
 
Table 6 Regression Results (including Barro’s Structure Impact Variable and Regional Dummies) 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII  Model VIII  Model IX 
Constant  0.0608 0.1874 0.2262 0.2294 0.0841 0.2100 0.2413 0.2333 0.2251 
  (0.0354) (0.0301) (0.0328) (0.0336) (0.0464) (0.0409) (0.0299) (0.0382) (0.0413) 
  [0.0985]* [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0845]* [0.0001]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** 
LnčGDPPL0Ď  0.0077 -0.0071 -0.0099 -0.0129 -0.0108 -0.0149 -0.0157 -0.0160 -0.0173 
  (0.0130) (0.0095) (0.0093) (0.0089) (0.0070) (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0058) (0.0061) 
  [0.5575] [0.4634] [0.2971] [0.1618] [0.1369]  [0.0201]** [0.0286]** [0.0125]** [0.0105]** 
Barro’s structure 
variable  
-0.5622 -0.6152 -0.7485 -0.4932 0.5233  0.0294 -0.1507 -0.0574 0.1628 
  (0.8591) (0.5657) (0.5319) (0.5177) (0.4546) (0.5537) (0.4420) (0.5322) (0.5468) 
  [0.5188] [0.2881] [0.1733] [0.3511] [0.2627] [0.9583] [0.7367] [0.9153] [0.7694] 
TCI7885     -0.0019       -0.0017   
     (0.0006)       (0.0006)   
     [0.0040]***      [0.0094]***  
TCI      -0.0034       -0.0030 
      (0.0014)       (0.0012) 
      [0.0249]**       [0.0203]** 
SAVE          0.0395 0.0107 0.0106 0.0136 0.0218 
          (0.0260) (0.0206) (0.0228) (0.0179) (0.0212) 
       [0.1440]  [0.6111]  [0.6470]  [0.4561]  [0.3190] 
LABG          -1.2643 -1.0205 -0.9430 -0.9755 -0.8715 
          (0.4260) (0.3467) (0.3583) (0.3054) (0.2983) 
       [0.0073]*** [0.0083]*** [0.0160]**  [0.0050]*** [0.0091]*** 
HUMK82          -0.0815 -0.0433 -0.0216 -0.0566 -0.0592 
          (0.0279) (0.0361) (0.0292) (0.0349) (0.0335) 
       [0.0081]*** [0.2450]  [0.4687]  [0.1216]  [0.0936]*   29 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII  Model VIII  Model IX 
FDI       0.0070  0.0019    0.0022  0.0022 
       (0.0017)  (0.0020)    (0.0020)  (0.0020) 
       [0.0004]*** [0.3595]    [0.2819]  [0.2840] 
Dummy  for  central  areas   -0.0272 -0.0244 -0.0223    -0.0182 -0.0233 -0.0151 -0.0140 
    (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0045)    (0.0072) (0.0045) (0.0069) (0.0069) 
   [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0001]***   [0.0196]**  [0.0000]*** [0.0414]**  [0.0595]* 
Dummy for western 
areas 
  -0.0372 -0.0344 -0.0301    -0.0286 -0.0341 -0.0259 -0.0223 
    (0.0054) (0.0057) (0.0067)    (0.0072) (0.0062) (0.0073) (0.0084) 
   [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0002]***  [0.0008]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0163]** 
Adjusted R
2  -0.0684 0.6569 0.6833 0.7017 0.5737 0.6927 0.6968 0.7129 0.7180   30
V. Concluding Remarks   

In this paper, we study regional disparities in China’s economy. It is found that 
a province’s attempt to adopt a CAD strategy in industrial development has a 
significantly negative effect on the province’s GDP growth. Judging from the TCI in 
each province, shown in Table 3, the central and western provinces tend to follow 
the CAD strategy more closely than do the eastern provinces. Pursuit of the wrong 
industrial development strategy in the central and western regions contributed to the 
observed widening of regional disparities after the 1978 reforms. It is imperative for 
each province, especially those provinces in the central and western regions, to 
allocate its new additional investments and restructure its existing industries 
according to its regional comparative advantages so that the regional disparities can 
be narrowed along with the dynamic growth. To shift the development of a regional 
economy away from its comparative advantage requires that the government 
protect/subsidize enterprises that are not viable due to their ambitious choices of 
industries, products and technologies. The accession to WTO is greatly reducing the 
possibility for the Chinese government to protect/subsidize any enterprises. In 
anticipation of the requirements of the WTO accession, the Chinese government has 
formally adopted the principle of comparative advantage as a guideline for the future 
development of the agriculture, manufacturing, and service industries and for the 
adjustment of the national economy in the “Tenth Five-Year Plan” in 2001. Regional 
disparities may not be eliminated totally due to the differences in natural conditions. 
However, in the new era after the WTO accession, the trend toward the widening of 
regional disparities may be mitigated. 
    31
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